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Abstract
Rental scams are a type of advance fee fraud, in which the scammer tries to get
a victim to pay a deposit to rent an apartment of which the scammer pretends to
be the landlord. We specifically focused on fraudulent long-term rentals advertised
in the UK on Craigslist. After a victim responds to the scammer’s advertisement,
the scammer attempts to persuade them to transfer money without having seen the
property. We were interested in which persuasion techniques scammers use, and
in assessing their skill at the art of persuasion. During a period of three weeks,
we scraped 2 112 letting advertisements, identified the fraudulent advertisements
and had 44 conversations of around 4 or 5 emails each with the scammers. Our
analysis indicates that Cialdini’s marketing-based social persuasion strategies, such
as liking, appeal to authority, and the need for commitment and consistency are
extensively implemented by rental scammers. Of Stajano and Wilson’s scam-based
persuasion strategies, an appeal to sympathy (i.e., kindness) and need for greed were
commonly used. We identified two further social persuasion strategies: establishing
credibility and removing objections. At a superficial level, rental scammers seem
skilled at their job, because they mimic genuine landlords and use a range of effective
persuasion techniques. However, when examining their emails more closely, we see
they often use pre-scripted emails, their mimicry is often incompetent, and they
have a lack of language skills and cultural knowledge that may tip people off. They
appear to be the criminal equivalent of a boilerhouse sales operation, a modus
operandi that has not previously been studied by cybercrime researchers.
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1 Introduction
Fraud, the act of deception for personal gain, and its deterrence, can be traced back
to ancient times. It is a recurring theme in Greek mythology, with many stories about
Dolos (the spirit of trickery and guile) and Apate (the goddess of fraud and deceit).
Although fraud has occurred throughout history, its prevalence and shape have changed
over time. Technological developments such as the post, telephone and fax enabled
fraudsters to target potential victims more efficiently, removing the need for face-to-face
contact [33]. The latest evolution started in the nineties when the use of email became
widespread [2, 16]; as more and more people went online, scammers started to use the
Internet to target millions of people worldwide while concealing their true identity and
location [9].
Although the Internet has affected a range of existing fraud types and created several
new ones, it has greatly increased the ease and incidence of advance fee frauds (AFF).
Also called ‘419 scams’ from the relevant article in the Nigerian Criminal Code, these
typically involve tricking a potential victim into transferring money by persuading them
that they will shortly receive a larger sum of money in return [5].
Scammers experiment with different story-scripts [33], but a classic tactic is to im-
personate a wealthy and powerful person with access to a large sum of money [9]. The
scammer’s tale is that before this fortune can be accessed, he needs an accomplice; then
a small payment needs to be made, for example to cover processing fees, unforeseen taxes
or insurance. The collection of these ‘advance fees’ is the real objective of the scam [21].
AFF in its current international form, originated in Nigeria in the seventies and is
still largely driven by fraudsters from West Africa [5, 21]. A sense of historical revenge
provides a sense of justification to at least some scammers; during the trial of Nigerian
lawyer and alleged fraud kingpin Fred Ajudua, for a series of 419 offences, he claimed
that the frauds were “compensation from white men for slavery and colonialism” [12, 23].
1.1 Rental scams
A specific type of AFF is the rental scam. We came across different types of rental
scams, including short-term holiday rentals and long-term letting. On the long-term
rental market, scams can be divided between those where an apartment can be viewed
before payment is made, and scams in which viewing is not possible [27]. In the latter, the
victim responds to an advert for a property and pays money up front without viewing the
place. The scammer’s advertisement may make the property seem especially desirable or
the rent may be set below the market rate. Once a potential victim answers, emails are
exchanged and then a reason is found for the victim to transfer money.
Although not being able to view a property before renting would serve as a red flag
for some people, it may not put off students and other people who move across country or
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even across borders, as they may have no choice but to rent sight unseen. In other cases,
the scammer is prepared to offer a viewing but only once a fee has been paid to cover
a credit check, postage for sending keys for a viewing, or a deposit may be requested
along with advance rent. In some cases the victim may just be asked to make a Western
Union payment to a friend to show that they have sufficient funds, but the scammer
impersonates the friend and steals the money.
Although rental scams have not previously been studied in the literature, they are
widespread. Based on an online survey by Shelter in 2010, the UK National Fraud
Authority estimated that all rental scams together annually cause 315,000 victims to lose
on average of £2,394, leading to an overall cost of £755 million a year [20]. However, the
Shelter survey covered many other types of rental scams besides the AFF version that we
discuss here [24] and in particular it included disputes where a landlord refuses to refund
a tenant’s deposit.
As an order of magnitude estimate for the AFF component of the overall fraud figure,
we attempted to determine how many Cambridge students had been affected by such
frauds in 2014. The police received 44 victim reports, but all appear to be for a specific
scam that targeted students with fake websites, local phone numbers and some convincing
paperwork. Scaling this up across all UK students (of which around 1% are in Cambridge)
would imply an overall impact of around £4 million per annum, but this will be on the
high side because the scam was specific to Cambridge and a handful of other towns, and
was rather more convincingly executed than the scams that we look at in this paper.
Equally not all victims are students and not all victims report their loss to the police –
so our best estimate is that the annual take from AFF style rental scams in the UK is in
the range £2–10 million – and may be of a similar magnitude in several other countries
because we have also seen scams targeting rentals in other European and US cities.
We personally got interested in rental scams when the first author encountered a fake
letting advertisement when moving to Cambridge for a post-doctoral research position.
Fortunately, she realised it was a scam before transferring money, but it made her re-
alise how well-crafted this type of AFF could be. Since then, she has been in contact
with several people at the University of Cambridge who have lost money this way. The
experiences of four scam victims are described later in this paper.
Other indications that rental scams are becoming a serious issue is provided by large
housing websites such as Craigslist, Trulia, and Zillow, which now explicitly mention
rental scams in their help section on “how to avoid getting scammed” [7, 28, 32]. Although
many fraudsters appear to operate from outside the jurisdiction, in some cases criminals
have been caught and prosecuted.
3
1.2 Why do scams work?
To understand why scams succeed, and to prevent others from falling victim in the future,
researchers have tried to determine why victims fall for scams. For example, Modic and
Lea investigated how personality traits correlate with the likelihood of being scammed,
and found that traits such as extraversion and openness can put one at risk [19]. Although
an interesting result, it is not obvious how we might use it to reduce the number of
incidents.
An alternative approach involves studying the methodology of scams [31]. Previous
research has demonstrated that scammers tend to borrow social persuasion strategies
from the marketing industry [26, 6]. For example, interviews with real victims show that
scammers frequently appeal to scarcity (highlighting a limited offer), authority (forging
emails from the FBI) and exploit people’s greed (stressing the amounts of money in-
volved). Carter’s text analysis of postal scams revealed that scammers appeal to scarcity,
but also inspire secrecy [4].
Wilson experimented on unwitting members of the public using a variety of (staged)
scams in the BBC TV program “The Real Hustle” [26]. Stajano andWilson demonstrated
that these scams implement all six social persuasion strategies identified by Cialdini: reci-
procity, commitment and consistency, liking, authority, scarcity and social proof [6], plus
the ‘need and greed’ principle described by Lea et al. [18]. Their analysis also identified
three additional persuasion techniques: ‘distraction’, ‘dishonesty’ and ‘kindness’, leading
to a total of ten scam-related persuasion techniques. However, their principle of ‘kind-
ness’ expressed as “people are fundamentally nice and willing to help”, typically revolves
around the telling of sad stories, and so we have renamed it to the more intuitive notion
of appealing to ‘sympathy’.
The majority of research on AFF has focused on interviews with victims but some
researchers have analysed the initial letter or email sent by the scammer [21, 4]. However,
most AFF does not involve a single email. Instead, the scammer and victim often ex-
change several emails before money is transferred and the scam is completed. From the
interactive communication literature we know that interaction partners influence each
other, so the behaviour of one person depends on the behaviour of the other [11]. In
this paper, we analyse how the interaction between scammer and victim develops over
time by analysing email exchanges. This analysis also provides an opportunity to study
whether the criminals appear to be skilled in the arts of persuasion.
1.3 Current study
The current study provides us with some basic statistical data on the prevalence of rental
scams on Craigslist along with some indications as to the number of criminals involved.
We are also able to explain the basic mechanics of the fraud, how the criminals construct
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the fake advertisements and the types of stories they tell to justify an advance payment.
We then discuss the types of persuasion techniques the criminals use. Their meth-
ods have been coded based on Cialdini’s social persuasion categorization, including reci-
procity, commitment and consistency, liking, authority, scarcity and social proof [6]. Each
email was also coded for the additional scam principles ‘need and greed’ [18], ‘distrac-
tion’, ‘dishonesty’ and ‘sympathy’ [26]. We then found that there were further relevant
techniques which had not been described by these authors; we dub them ‘establishing
credibility’ and ‘removing objections’.
We assess the criminals’ competence at using these methods, and also whether they
were sticking to a pre-determined script or were capable of adapting to circumstances
as the email conversation progressed. In other words, we consider not just the scenarios
that might convince the victim to send money, but also the way in which the criminal
tries to persuade the victim that they should act.
To answer these research questions, we gathered a set of fake letting advertisements
and subsequently interacted with the advertisers through email. Because our interactions
with the scammers stopped before an actual money transfer had taken place, we complete
the picture by including the self-reported experiences of four real victims of rental scams.
2 Methods
2.1 Procedure
In early 2014, we ran an experiment in which, for three consecutive weeks, we scraped
letting advertisements off the classified advertising website Craigslist across 27 UK cities,
after which we sent email replies to a large number of apparently fake adverts. Our aim
was to gain a better understanding of rental scams and the methods scammers use to
persuade victims to transfer money.
During the experiment we manually categorized each advertisement as ‘genuine’,
‘fake’, ‘unsure’ or, when the advert had been placed in the wrong category, ’irrelevant’.
When an advertisement was categorized as fake, or when we were unsure, an automated
email response was sent to the advertiser.
To make it harder for scammers to recognize the true source of our emails, we created
a webmail account for each advert with a different ‘person’ operating each one. We
constructed the responders’ unique names by randomly combining common British first
and last names. All the first names were unisex (e.g., Ashley, Rowan, Dylan, and Charlie).
These names were checked for plausibility by three British English native speakers, and
only included when all three agreed. This way, the gender of the victim was initially
unknown to the scammer.
Each of our initial replies to the adverts was automatically created by randomly
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Figure 1: Framework for the first paragraph of the response email showing the alternative
phrasing for each part of the sentences that were constructed.
{I am|I’m} {very|very much|really|extremely|genuinely} interested in {your
advertisement|your property|your house|your place|the property you adver-
tised|the place you advertised|the house you advertised}. It {seems |looks
|sounds} {great! |amazing! |nice. |really nice. |lovely. |like a good opportu-
nity. |a good deal.}
selecting alternatives from a pre-set framework, set out in Figure 1. Although the word
use and content of each automated email was unique, our messages always displayed an
interest in the advertised property, provided some personal information, asked a question
about the property and included a request for a viewing.
On receiving an answer from the advertiser, the original advertisement was re-evaluated.
When an advertisement now seemed genuine, we sent an apology email, explaining we
were no longer interested in the property. When an advertisement was still categorized
as unsure, we continued the interaction with the advertiser. For all advertisements cate-
gorized as fake, we started an email conversation with the advertiser to learn about the
scam process and the social persuasion techniques used. For ease of interpretation, the
advertiser will henceforth be called the “scammer”, and the experimenter the “victim”.
After the initial template-based email, all further email contact was conducted manu-
ally following a set of guidelines. First, all chosen names were purposefully gender neutral,
but upon request the victim revealed she was female. Second, to indicate employment
and income security, the victim would state that they had just been offered a job with a
1/2/3 year contract at the local university in a variety of disciplines. Third, when asked,
the victim mentioned she had to move from one UK city to another for her new job,
implying that she was not familiar with the housing on offer. Fourth, to minimize the
chance of being rejected, the victim did not smoke and did not have pets.
In the follow-up emails, the researcher manually responded to the scammer’s ques-
tions if applicable, while displaying a continuous interest in the property and repeatedly
requesting a viewing. This strategy was repeated until the scammer first requested a
money transfer. Then a three step procedure was followed. In the first two emails after
the money transfer request, the victim replied showing hesitation about the transfer but
a continued interest in the property. These emails usually included a proposed alterna-
tive to the money transfer (e.g., a deposit and first month’s rent payment in cash upon
satisfactory viewing and contract signing), or a request for more information. In the
third email after the financial request the potential customer made clear that she would
not transfer money without viewing the property, and that she was no longer interested
in the property. This procedure gave scammers a maximum of three emails to convince
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the victim to transfer the money. In two cases (ID 75 and 78) we accidentally stopped
responding but the other conversations ran until the protocol completed or the scammer
failed to reply.
2.2 Dataset
Over a period of three weeks, from 12 February to 3 March 2014, we automatically scraped
2 112 advertisements that appeared on the UK accommodation sections of Craigslist. We
categorized each advertisement based on its content, language use and the characteristics
of the accommodation using four simple heuristics:
1. When something seemed too good to be true, we assumed it was a scam. For
example, low rental prices or pictures of amazing interiors were a reliable indicator.
2. We deemed it a scam when text seemed more appropriate for holiday rentals, such
as the provision of fresh towels on a daily basis. Misplaced adverts for holiday
lets were all ignored, whether or not they appeared to be a scam, because we only
wished to consider adverts for longer periods of rental.
3. Scams often misused capital letters or had grammar and spelling mistakes. Again
this was only an indicator because this heuristic also applied to some genuine indi-
viduals, predominantly those renting out student rooms.
4. The most reliable criterion involved googling phrases and pictures from the adverts
to see if they appeared anywhere else. We found that text and pictures were often
copied verbatim from a genuine website, with the only difference being a lower price,
and often a different location. For example, luxury apartments in Manhattan, US,
were suddenly for rent in London for a quarter of the price.
Using these guidelines, 119 adverts were classified as either ‘fake’ or ‘unsure’. After
email interaction with each advertiser, we decided that 55 adverts were truly scams,
29 were genuinely posted by an individual, 23 were genuinely posted by a legitimate
business and we remained unsure about the remaining 12. Of the 55 scam conversations,
we removed an additional 11 because two involved immediate redirection to a dubious
website so there was no email conversation. The other nine turned out to be for short-
term holiday accommodation – different rental scams that fall outside the scope of this
paper. This left us with a dataset of 44 scam conversations.
In addition to analysing the data per email or per scam conversation, we also at-
tempted to take into account that some conversations may have been held with the same
person. We tried to identify them based on their name, email address and copy-pasted
email content. We believe that we were communicating with 21 different scammers, with
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whom we had between one and six scam conversations each (M = 2.10, SD = 1.81).
However, this is only an estimate and the true number may have been less.
Our email interactions stopped before any money was transferred, because that would
involve crossing an ethical and possibly a legal boundary. However, to be able to under-
stand what happened in rental scams after the money transfer we invited real rental
scam victims to fill out a questionnaire about their experience, which four people did.
Although this is too few for statistical analyses, the information does provide insights
into the rental scam process from the victim’s point of view. The questionnaire consisted
of demographic questions such as gender (50% female), age (18–25), education (all BSc
or higher), and profession (all students), and included questions about their scam expe-
rience. We asked about where they saw the advertisement, the pretext for the payment,
how much money was lost and how they found out they had been scammed. Respondents
were also asked to indicate the financial and emotional impact the scam had on them.
The answers are discussed in the results section.
To summarise our dataset: from inspecting three weeks of letting advertisements
on Craigslist we held 44 email conversations with scammers and we added to this the
information provided by four real victims of rental scams. This rich and interactive
dataset has enabled us to identify scam characteristics, to learn how scammers persuade
their potential victims to transfer money, and ultimately, to determine if the scammers
are skilled at the art of persuasion.
2.3 Coding persuasion data
Our dataset not only includes the initial advertisement, but also the emails in which the
scammer attempts to persuade the victim to transfer money. To establish if scammers
are any good at the art of persuasion, we manually coded each scam email for established
social persuasion techniques.
We initially coded a total of ten persuasion techniques, including Cialdini’s reciprocity,
commitment and consistency, liking, authority, scarcity and social proof [6], Lea et al.’s
need and greed [18], and Stajano and Wilson’s distraction, dishonesty, and sympathy [26].
While Cialdini’s six persuasion techniques were based on human behaviour in general,
the remaining four techniques were identified by analysing actual scams.
In addition, for each email we analysed whether the scammer made spelling and
grammar mistakes. Abbreviations and ‘texting’ language such as “pls” for “please” and
“u” for “you” were not counted as spelling/grammar mistakes, as they may have been
intentional. Because we were trying to measure lack of English skills and not sloppiness,
we overlooked the first mistake in each email, but any further errors meant that the email
was deemed to contain ‘mistakes’.
We now describe the ten persuasion techniques that we were looking for, discussing
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each of them in the context of rental scams.
2.3.1 Reciprocity (Cialdini, [6])
Reciprocity is the human tendency to return what we get; if someone does us a favour,
we are more likely to do a favour in return. Scammers can use reciprocity by offering
something small first, in order to increase the chance of the victim transferring the funds.
Alternatively, the scammer can copy the victim’s mood, for example by showing hesitation
or even aggression when the victim starts doubting the legitimacy of the deal (see ID 92).
ID 92. As I told you UPS had this service and I have used it in the past. It
is simple. They will hold your money until you visit the apartment and if you
are not satisfied they will transfer the amount back into your account. You
won’t lose anything. So please think again and if you agree just give me your
full name and address so we can get started.
2.3.2 Commitment and consistency (Cialdini, [6])
This principle, also known as the ‘foot in the door’ technique, encompasses people’s wish
to continue something they have already started so as to be consistent. For example, the
scammer can show his commitment by claiming he has reserved the apartment ‘especially
for you’. He can then ask for a token of commitment, by asking the victim to transfer a
deposit to show they are serious about renting the apartment, as demonstrated by ID 10:
ID 10: The 100 is not postage fee, is part of deposit to reserve the place for
you because other tenant also making enquiry about the place. If you are
comfortable with that, I will mail the keys to the building manager.
2.3.3 Liking (Cialdini, [6])
People are more likely to be influenced by people they like. A scammer can increase the
chance of being liked by being friendly, caring, giving compliments, or even emphasizing
similarities with the victim. For example, the scammer in ID 31 combined being friendly
with listing his traits, habits and preferences in order to increase the victim’s chances of
finding similarities:
ID 31: About Me: i am a simple person. simple and uncomplicated. i enjoy
the simple joys and pleasures that life has to offer. like coffee when i wake
up in the morning or whenever i feel like having a cup. listening to music
reading or watching a movie. just being able to wake up in the morning.
laughing spending time with friends ( i don’t have that many) spending time
with flatmates and best of all spending time with my boyfriend. i don’t like
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things that are complicated or too complex. i like things that flow together
easily seamlessly. i want things that are cut and dried things that make sense.
i like answers like yes or no, i don’t like maybe because it is so uncertain. clear
answer make me feel a certain sense of security. and that feeling of security
is vital to me. it’s like water or food for me, i like meeting new people who
are ready to share experience, talk and a cup of coffee and watch movie with
me as well.
ID 13 explicitly highlighted the similarities between victim and scammer:
ID 13: I’m happy that you are a woman like me.I’m with my mum now and
I can only take the next available flight to england if you can send a month
money to any of your trusted friend in UK via money gramm transfer or
western union money transfer.
2.3.4 Authority (Cialdini, [6])
An appeal to authority relies on people’s sense of obligation and respect to people in
authority, and as a result, people are more likely to be influenced by an authority figure
than by people at random. Authority can be induced in different ways, including wearing
a uniform, displaying a title or important job, and having accessories such as expensive
gadgets and cars. Rental scammers frequently refer to their lawyer or solicitor in order
to give their proposal extra weight, as was done by ID 2. Alternatively, scammers can
try to increase their influence by mentioning their own well-paid job or important title.
ID 2: Thanks for getting back to me. I wouldn’t want you to get me wrong,
the idea of making a confirmation of your financial ability is not only my idea,
my solicitor and i decided to use that process and i can’t violate my solicitor
procedure. I am a God fearing woman and i am not after your money. I have
my own work and i earn enough money for my family and also to help the
less privileged.
2.3.5 Scarcity (Cialdini, [6])
Limiting the availability of an offer will increase the demand. Availability can be limited
through time pressure or by limiting the stock. In general, scammers emphasised time
pressure with statements such as ‘as soon as possible’, ‘now’ and ‘quickly’. Rental scam-
mers also demonstrated scarcity by mentioning that other people were interested in the
apartment as well, pushing the victim to decide quickly. For example, ID 36 forwarded an
email from another potential tenant, demonstrating that the apartment was in demand.
10
ID 36. Hello Natalie, Good afternoon hope your doing great? Just so you
know I have stopped responding to other people interested in the flat here is
another info of a tenant wanting the flat urgently,
Email of other potential tenant: My full name is XXXXX, I’m new to New
Hampshire from Miami Florida and I’m looking for a place where me my
daughter and my fiance´ can live. My fiance´ can provide all occupation in-
formation as I am currently seeking for employment, but his income alone
can cover the monthly cost. He is the manager at the XXXXX restaurant in
XXXXX. We have no pets. My expected move in date is march 15th. My
move out date depends on when you expect for me to move out. As long as I
can rent at least a year I am fine with everything, But be rest assured the flat
is yours sincerely to me you sound more serious i would be waiting to hear
from you as soon as possible.
2.3.6 Social proof (Cialdini, [6])
People are more likely to do something if they have proof that other people are doing
the same thing. Especially in uncertain or new circumstances, people tend to look at
others before deciding what to do. Scammers can use this need for social proof to their
advantage, by explicitly mentioning their previous renters went through the same pro-
cedure and were happy with the outcome (as ID 26 demonstrates). More deceptively,
the scammer can offer the contact details of a ‘happy previous tenant’, so they can be
directly asked about their experiences.
ID 26. I would like you to know that i am not after your money as i have
my own work and i know what it takes to earn a living and also i thought i
have explain the whole process to your understanding as you need to make a
payment before we can proceed with the viewing as the tenant that left my flat
from Oxford also follow the same process and there wasn’t any problem.
2.3.7 Need and greed (Lea et al., [18])
Wanting or even needing something creates vulnerability because it will cause people to
be more easily persuaded. A rental scammer can appeal to a person’s need and greed in
two ways: first, by offering something the potential victim is likely to want, such as a
great apartment for low cost, as is exemplified by ID 16; secondly, they can emphasise
how great a deal, or ‘once in a lifetime opportunity’ their apartment is.
ID 16: This is one of the best apartments you can get at this reasonable rate.
The apartment is available for your dates but I cannot guarantee the hold of
the apartment until booking is made.
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We created an additional need and greed measure for each complete interaction based
on rental price and location, using a set of threshold values (London, £400 for a room
and £800 for an apartment; South England, £350 and £700; North England, Scotland
and Ireland, £200 and £400). When the advertised rent was below the threshold, the
interaction was coded as an appeal to need and greed.
2.3.8 Distraction (Stajano and Wilson, [26])
When distracted or even blinded by something of interest, people are less likely to think
of possible threats. For example, a scammer may try to distract their victim by pointing
out further benefits of their apartment, though most of the examples in our dataset also
invoked sympathy, such as the request for a loan to assist the sick mother of ID 13:
ID 13: Oh miss Izzel,you really diapoint me.there are many people wanted
to get the appartment and I told them it has been occupied by you.I told you
my mum is sick and she’s in the hospital. Anyway goodluck with your new
appartment but I will apriciate if you can borrow me money to pay the bills
here in the hospital and buy some drugs for here.please I’m waiting for your
response.I promise I will return it when she get back and I found someone that
will get my property.hope to hear from you soon.thanks
2.3.9 Dishonesty (Stajano and Wilson, [26])
Some scams cause the victim to engage in illegal behaviour, which can be used to persuade
them not to report the scammer. For example, in a classic 419 scam, the victim is asked
to impersonate a relative of a recently deceased rich man so as to receive an inheritance
from a crooked executor. However victims will not commit offences when renting property
and we found no scammers using this persuasion method.
2.3.10 Sympathy (called “kindness” by Stajano and Wilson, [26])
People tend to help others, so appealing to someone’s sympathy can influence their be-
haviour. Rental scammers can emphasize their difficult situation and ask you to help
them. For example, they may mention an ill mother they must take care of, or that they
have had a bad experience with other renters in the past.
ID 58. Thank you for the response to my listing, I’m the owner of the apart-
ment you are making inquiry of. Actually my parents resided in the apart-
ment before i lost both parents in a ghastly motor accident1 so i had to re-
locate to Africa to with my fathers half brother running a charity home in
1A “ghastly accident” is somewhat of a cliche´ in 419 scam emails – the term being somewhat dated
and jarring to modern British ears.
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Africa.(W.AFRICA) and presently my apartment is still available which i in-
herited from my late parents for rent.You where actually supposed to be sharing
apartment with me but since i had to relocate i need someone who can look
after the apartment for now.
3 Results
Our scam conversation dataset of 44 email conversations, of four to five emails each,
plus the scraped advertisements and the gathered victim experiences, was analysed to
provide an insight into a number of different topics. We wanted to be able to describe
the key characteristics of rental scams; we wished to understand which social persuasion
strategies rental scammers use; and we wanted to determine how good the scammers were
at their task. We will conclude this section with a discussion of what we learnt from four
real scam victims.
3.1 Scam characteristics
3.1.1 Origin
Advance fee fraud is generally believed to be a speciality of criminals fromWest Africa [22].
In this study, most of our correspondents took advantage of Craiglist’s email relay sys-
tem which hides the true identity of our correspondents, so we cannot form a view as to
whether rental scammers fit into this general pattern.
We can get a small hint by analysing the telephone numbers that six (14%) of the
scammers provided. Of these, four were UK 070 numbers, one was from Ohio, USA, and
one from Nigeria. The UK 070 range is for ’personal numbers’ allocated to people who
continually change locations and can be answered pretty much anywhere in the world.
These numbers are widely used by West African fraudsters because they appear to be
UK numbers – and our searching turned up previous reports of AFF scams associated
with three of the four numbers.
3.1.2 Prevalence
In our UK sample, gathered over three weeks from Craigslist, 44 out of 2 021 catego-
rized letting advertisements (2.2%) were rental scams for long-term letting that did not
immediately redirect potential victims to a website. This number should be interpreted
cautiously, because we only examined one classified advertising site in one country. In
addition, we encountered several other scams, including holiday rental scams, letting
scams using fraudulent websites, and advertisements where rent would be waived in re-
turn for sexual favours. The other scams were outside the scope of this paper and were
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not examined in detail.
3.1.3 What is on offer
The majority of the 44 fake advertisements were for multi-room apartments (91%), with
the rest being single rooms (9%). None of them were for entire houses, although houses
are offered by genuine landlords on the same website. The apartments were located
mainly (57%) in London (25) with the remaining 19 being in Cambridge (5), Aberdeen
(3), Liverpool (3), Manchester (2), Oxford (2), Bath (1), Brighton (1), Coventry (1) and
Edinburgh (1).
On average, scammers offered their housing for £651.33 per month (SD = £332.78).
The main goal of rental scams is making money, but because the scammers don’t own
the apartment, the victims will not end up living in it, and the scammers will not be
able to charge rent except possibly for a month’s rent in advance. Instead, when they
ask victims to transfer money they give several reasons – with most victims being asked
to transfer money as a deposit to secure the apartment.
On average, the scammer mentioned the need for an upfront payment between their
second and third email (M = 2.39, SD = .77, Range 1–5), and instructed the victim
to make the transfer between the third and the fourth email (M = 3.52, SD = 1.18,
Range 2–6). This could be a deposit plus one month’s rent (32%), just a deposit (23%),
two months rent (7%), 2 months rent plus deposit (5%) or the cost of posting keys (5%);
the remainder were unknown or not applicable.
On average, victims were asked to transfer a deposit of £1 032.48 (SD = 625.26, Range
£100–£2 560) to secure the apartment, and they were asked to transfer this money in
several different ways. Most popular was Western Union (21%), followed by a redirect to
a website or third party (11%), MoneyGram (5%), either Western Union or MoneyGram
(5%), a general bank transfer (5%), or a mixture of methods (5%); the remainder was
unknown or not applicable.
In four cases the victim was asked to make a regular bank transfer to the scammer
and in five cases they were asked to transfer via a website or other third party. The most
popular request, made in 14 of the conversations (32%), was for a transfer to be made
not to the scammer, but to the victim herself or a trusted friend or family member, with
the explanation that this demonstrates that funds were available. ID 47 gives a typical
explanation of how to do this transfer via Western Union:
ID 47. 1. Locate the nearest western union outlet around you.
2. Pick up the form of transfer and fill in the details which needs to be filled
and return back to the post master.Details needed on the form are {sender
name;your name and address.}{receiver your friend’s name and address}
3. Return back to the post master with the cash you are transferring to your
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partner or friend and wait for the receipt to be returned back to you.
4. Scan the receipt to me so that i can forward it to my lawyer to check it if
its truly genuine and available in your friend’s custody.
5. After it has been confirmed valid, i will send you an email so that you can
inform the receiver to go an pick up the money and thereafter, you’ll schedule
a convenient time for the viewing.
The point of this payment method is that the victim will be under the impression
that their money can only be collected by the trusted person to whom they have wired
it. However, with both Western Union and MoneyGram, the scammers can pick up
this type of low-value transaction armed with only the details available on the scanned
receipt, provided that they are somewhere in the appropriate country and the intended
recipient has yet to collect it. In particular, there will be no need to display matching
government-issue ID. People are seldom aware of how these money transfer systems work
and fail to see how their transaction can go wrong. The rental scammer still needs an
accomplice in the UK; but it is preferable to using a UK bank account that could well
be closed if the police were to mount an investigation.
3.1.4 Scam interactions
Interacting with scammers provided an insight into the type of information scammers
are interested in. We analysed this on three different levels: per email (n = 183), per
conversation (n = 44), and per identified scammer (n = 21).
In total, scammers asked the victim for more information in 159 out of 183 emails
(85.9%). The most frequently asked question was a proof of payment ability (42.1%), for
example by asking to transfer a deposit, followed by a method of contact (25.1%), personal
information (23.5%), rental information such as move-in date (21.9%), a confirmation
that the victim wants to rent the apartment (20.2%), reassurance that the victim will
be a good tenant (16.9%), a reference (6.6%), return of the rental agreement (4.9%), a
proof of seriousness (3.8%), a photograph (3.3%), a suggestion of an alternative way to
demonstrate payment ability (1.6%), and when to arrange a viewing (1.1%).
Although scammers asked questions in the majority of their emails (85.9%), they
typically only answered a subset of the victim’s questions. The scammer answered at
least one question in 59.0% of all emails, and answered all outstanding questions in
39.3%.
The scammer provided new or additional information himself in 154 out of 183 emails
(84.2%). For example, the scammer included an attachment in 19 out of 183 emails
(10.4%), such as apartment photos (13), a rental agreement (4), and the landlord’s (i.e.,
the scammer’s) photo (1) or a scan of the scammer’s passport (1) – no doubt the photo
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and passport came from other victims.
Scam conversations on average consisted of 4.91 emails (SD = 2.96; Range 1–13). As
intended by our experimental design, most scammers stopped emailing after the third
refusal of payment (38.6%). The others gave up at other stages:
• 15.9% before the money request was made,
• 11.4% after the first hesitation,
• 13.6% after the second hesitation shown by the victim, and
• 6.8% at some another stage.
• 13.6% of the scammers kept on emailing after the third refusal, with the result that
we broke off the conversation.
On a conversation level (n = 44), the pattern of questions is slightly different. The
most frequently asked question was personal information (75%), followed by proof of
payment (71%), reassurance that the victim will be a good tenant (68%), rental infor-
mation (68%), method of contact (52%), a confirmation that the victim wants to rent
the apartment (45%), reference (23%), proof of seriousness (16%), return of rental agree-
ment (14%), send a photograph (14%), provide a suggestion of an alternative way to
demonstrate payment ability (7%), and when to arrange a viewing (5%).
The difference between the email and conversation level occurs because while scam-
mers ask many questions only once or twice, the request for a proof of payment ability
was asked repeatedly. This is directly linked to the goal of making money, whilst the
other questions merely serve to keep up appearances.
To study the role of pre-existing scripts in rental scam conversations, we analysed
email content on a scammer level (n = 21). To test similarities, two or more conversations
per scammer were needed. Out of 21 identified scammers, seven scammers fulfilled this
criterion. For those, we compared emails from different conversations and measured
similarities. We found that none of the seven scammers only sent unique emails. Instead,
they used scripted emails during each conversation. Four scammers sent scripted emails
without any adaptations, while five sent scripted emails in which they made small changes
such as name and rent. However, not all emails were scripted: five out of seven scammers
also wrote unique emails. The first two emails of six out of seven scammers were scripted
with or without small adaptations. Typically, the scammer started the conversation and
asked for the money transfer with scripted responses, but created unique emails once
the conversation developed further and the victim showed hesitation about the requested
transfer. This mirrors the sales pitch scripts taught to sales staff in legitimate volume
sales businesses such as investment and home improvements. These sales staff are also
taught a variety of techniques for rapport establishment, objection handling and closing,
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Table 1: Prevalence of the persuasion techniques used in rental scams. Those labelled C
are from Cialdini 1984, L from Lea et al. 2009 and S from Stajano and Wilson 2011.
Per email Per conversation Per scammer
Persuasion technique (n = 183) (n = 44) (n = 21)
C Commitment & consistency 53.5% 81.8% 100.0%
C Liking 47.0% 90.9% 85.7%
C Authority 42.1% 84.1% 90.5%
C Scarcity 30.6% 70.5% 81.0%
S Sympathy 25.7% 61.4% 61.4%
C Reciprocity 12.6% 43.2% 47.6%
C Social proof 7.7% 25.0% 38.1%
L Need and greed 2.2% 9.1% 14.3%
S Distraction 1.6% 4.5% 4.8%
S Dishonesty 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
as described for example by Cialdini, and we believe that scammers are operating in much
the same way.
3.2 Social persuasion techniques
We manually coded ten categories of social persuasion techniques for all emails that scam-
mers sent, including Cialdini’s six social persuasion techniques, Lea et al.’s ‘need and
greed’ and Stajano and Wilson’s ‘distraction’, ‘dishonesty’ and ‘sympathy’ [26, 6, 18].
We analysed the presence of these techniques on each individual email (n = 183). Then,
because scam conversations may develop over time and different persuasion strategies
may be used at different stages of the grooming processes, we also analysed the data on
a conversation level (n = 44). To measure whether persuasion techniques are scammer-
dependent or whether similar techniques are being used across all scammers, we addi-
tionally analysed the persuasion data by scammer (n = 21).
The results are given in Table 1 and they clearly demonstrate that the social persua-
sion techniques established by Cialdini, that are used in marketing and other facets of
life, are also frequently used in rental scams [6].
However, three of the four persuasion techniques, ‘need and greed’, ‘distraction’, ‘dis-
honesty’ which have been identified in other frauds were not used especially often in rental
scams [26, 18]. The exception was ‘sympathy’ (i.e., relying on people’s innate tendency
to be nice and willing to help). For example, scammers mentioned a death in the family
or a previous bad treatment by (potential) tenants.
Our result is partly explained by looking at the scam as a whole rather than just the
emails. Only 2% of the emails contained an explicit appeal to the victim’s need and greed
by stressing how good a deal was on offer. However, the whole premise of the original
advertisement was a nice apartment for a low price – a direct appeal to need and greed.
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Figure 2: Social persuasion techniques (%) analysed at the level of emails, conversations,
and scammers.
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To measure this we determined for each apartment if the price was significantly below
market value or not. In 68% of all fake advertisements, the rent was significantly below
what can be expected for the region, making the apartment ‘a bargain’.
The remaining two principles, distraction and dishonesty, were seldom used by rental
scammers. Distraction was only used in 1.6% of all emails, because the majority of emails
were focused on letting-related topics. Distraction might be a more effective strategy
when scamming someone face-to-face. As already noted, dishonesty is not relevant and
was never used.
3.3 Two new scam categories
When coding the emails, we found that some types of persuasion did not fit in with
the existing ten categories. This led us to add two new social persuasion categories:
establishing credibility and removing objections. Both are familiar enough from everyday
sales and marketing practice [8]. We present our complete analysis in Figure 2, which
displays the overall occurrence of social persuasion techniques in emails.
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3.3.1 Establishing credibility
From the deception literature we know that while truth tellers often take their credibility
for granted, liars can feel the need to convince their interaction partner they are telling
the truth [17, 30]. Something similar seems to occur in rental scam communication,
as we repeatedly found that scammers tried to establish their credibility. For example,
a scammer would provide a plausible reason why he was not using a letting agent; he
would offer to put the potential victim ‘in contact’ with a satisfied previous tenant; he
would provide another type of reference; he would pretend to arrange a viewing; he would
share personal information and even passports, or would mention genuine organisations
or initiatives such as the (real) Tenancy Deposit Protection Scheme (see ID 47). In some
cases the scammer would even warn their victim about the risk of scammers and online
fraud. This was all aimed at removing any doubt the potential victim might have about
the legitimacy of the scammer.
ID 47. Rent per calendar month is £320 { includes all bills : water, gas, coun-
cil tax, TV license and wireless Internet} also Security deposit of £600 And it
is protected by the Tenancy Deposit Protection Scheme (http: // www. depositprotection. com/ )
{Refundable after four weeks in the flat}.
In our data set, establishing credibility was used in 53.6% of all emails, making it the
most prevalent technique at the email level. Furthermore, establishing credibility was
used in 86% of all conversations and by 95% of all scammers. There is some overlap
between Cialdini’s ‘authority’ and our ‘establishing credibility’ because referring to an
authority figure such as a lawyer or solicitor can help enhance credibility, but our new
category contains enough original elements that we believe that it can be seen as a distinct
persuasion category.
Credibility establishment has previously been discussed in the marketing literature,
and even in a scam context [4, 13]. Carter analysed the initial communication of letters
and leaflets in postal scams, and identified that scammers promoted legitimacy and credi-
bility in their communication. She also identified that scammers used ‘inspiring urgency’,
which corresponds to the way we have interpreted Cialdini’s ‘scarcity’, and also ‘secrecy’,
which is not applicable to rental scams.
3.3.2 Remove objections
The second social persuasion technique we repeatedly came across was ‘removing objec-
tions’. In the real world, apartment and rental characteristics are often entirely inflexible;
a flat is available from a specific date and it is furnished or unfurnished. Scammers do
not actually have an apartment to rent out, so they can be flexible in what they offer.
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Through this removal of objections they can avoid potential victims deciding to drop out
before the question of payment arises.
For example, the apartment offered by ID 66 was available both for short-term and
long-term rental and you could stay in the flat as long as you paid your rent on time.
There were further reassurances about the payment process, and a long list of every
possible desirable item which would be provided free of charge, including a garage and
parking spot in the middle of London – and fresh towels on a daily basis.
ID 66. I can rent out the flat for unlimited time ( 1 to 5 years maybe more ).
I can also rent it for short periods, the rent for 1 month is £950 per month
including all utilities. You can use my furniture, or you can use your own,
it’s the same thing for me. I have the option of sending all my furniture to
storage, if you want to bring your own (no extra cost). You can move in to
the flat immediately.
In our data set, removing objections was used in 38.8% of all emails, making it the
fourth most prevalent technique at an email level. In addition, removing objections was
used in 86% of all conversations and by 91% of all scammers. Both its prevalence and
unique nature (removing objections does not overlap much with other, already existing
social persuasion strategies), makes ‘removing objections’ a useful addition to the scam
principles found in the literature.
We saw a few examples of negotiation and haggling, which are a way of removing
objections when done from the scammer’s (i.e., the seller’s) side, rather than by the
victim. For example, ID 58 offered his potential victim a deal: pay one month’s rent
plus deposit, or paying two months and getting an extra month for free. This is a classic
‘alternative question close’; “would you like to pay cash for your new car, or apply for
credit?” Later, when the experimenter hesitated, the scammer dropped the demand for
a deposit altogether, and offered to just send the keys for £100. So haggling, prevalent
in sales negotiations, takes on an even more fluid form in the hands of scammers.
3.4 Skilled scammers?
The majority of previous scam communication research has been conducted on the scam-
mer’s initial email or letter [21, 4]. However, based on success rates and feedback, these
initial emails may have evolved over time and may be used by large numbers of scammers.
In other words, to send a successful first email, copy-paste skills may be more important
than language and persuasion skills. By interacting with scammers in on-going email
conversations, we have gained a unique insight into the scammers’ skill-set. We will now
assess how competent we believe the criminals to be; whether we felt they were sticking
to a pre-determined script or whether they were capable of adapting to circumstances as
the email conversation progressed.
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There were a number of reasons for viewing rental scammers as skilful:
• Scammers would regularly adapt to changing circumstances. For example, they
answered at least one question from the victim in 82% of all conversations, showing
they paid attention to what the victim wanted to know. The scammers’ responses
also showed a high degree of flexibility and willingness to adapt their strategy.
For example, upon the victim’s hesitation about Western Union, scammer ID 77
provided general bank account details so payment could be made another way.
• Five of the seven scammers we held multiple conversations with constructed unique
emails, allowing them to answer the victim’s questions and remove objections.
• Rental scammers tried to mimic genuine house owners to enhance their credibility.
For example, scammers provided new information in 84% of their emails, and asked
victims for information such as personal information, references and a method of
contact in 86%. Some scammers not only asked for a reference, but offered one as
well. ID 25 went so far as to provide the email address of a ‘previous tenant’.
• Scammers mentioned the possibility of viewing in 70% of all conversations, even
though viewing would never take place. Viewing offers often came with an expla-
nation why viewing was not immediately possible; the most common excuse was
that the scammer moved away or lived elsewhere within the UK (41%), followed
by being abroad (36%), that there were other people living in the apartment (7%),
and having had a previous negative experience (5%). Only 9% of scammers ignored
the victim’s viewing request altogether.
• Scammers generally used the anonymising email system provided by the Craigslist
website, but they would also (in 55% of all conversations) try to appear genuine by
providing a specific method of contact, such as an email address, telephone number
or Skype address. Six people provided a telephone number and four of those would
appear to the uninitiated to be a UK number.
• Scammers have crafted a convincing method for victims to transfer money without
asking victims to transfer money to them. Although some people might be cautious
when Western Union or MoneyGram transfers are requested, they might not realise
that the receipt contains sufficient information to pick up money that is sent in
someone else’s name.
• Several scammers, including ID 92, highlighted the risks involved with money trans-
fers and suggested using a third party to manage the deposit and key delivery (such
third parties are of course part of the scam). Some scammers even referred to the
rules of the ‘Landlord Association’ to justify their request for an upfront payment.
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ID 92. I am sorry but this is the only solution to this transaction. I
must have a guarantee before I send the keys abroad. UPS is a serious
company and they are known worldwide. They have a good reputation and
your money will be 100 % safe. I have used this service in the past and I
was very satisfied. Please think about it and give me your final answer.
• The scammers made ample use of established social persuasions techniques; they
tried to establish credibility and appeal to commitment and consistency in more
than half of their emails. They also made an effort to be liked, appealed to authority,
and removed potential objections in more than a third of all emails.
We conclude that rental scammers have some skill at their job – and as noted large
numbers of people fall for rental scams each year. On the other hand, there were also
shortcomings in their persuasive techniques.
• 98% of all scam conversations contained more than one spelling or grammar mistake,
making it difficult to understand some of the emails and reducing their credibility.
• It was clear that scammers had often just copy-pasted a standard email, not just
in the initial response but also further along in the conversation. So although
scammers regularly (82%) responded to at least one of the victim’s questions across
a conversation, they only answered all questions in 39% of all emails. In other words,
in two-thirds of the emails, at least one of the victim’s questions was ignored. What
seems to have been occurring is that the questions our ‘victims’ posed related to
the rental process and the pre-scripted emails ‘accidentally’ answered some of these
questions.
• Although the majority (71%) of the seven scammers that we held more than one
conversation with wrote some unique emails, none of them only sent unique emails.
Instead, all scammers made use of scripted emails, and 57% even sent scripted emails
without making changes like adding the victim’s name. This finding demonstrates
that copy-pasting is an essential part of the scammer’s toolkit.
• Although scammers offered a viewing in 70% of all conversations, these offers were
only specific enough (i.e., proposing a day and a time) that an actual viewing would
only be possible in 20% of all conversations. Such specific offers were conditional on
money changing hands first. Similarly, one can only view an apartment armed with
the street address, and although in 89% of all conversations the scammer mentioned
some address details, they only provided the exact address in 18% of conversations.
• Although some scammers asked victims to make a money transfer to a trusted
friend, others asked for funds to be sent direct to them. Receiving a money transfer
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request before viewing will be considered a red flag by many potential victims, and
several institutions and websites advise against make such a transfer [7, 28, 32, 10].
That said, people who are not in the position to view an apartment may feel they
have little choice.
• Scammers tended to be sloppy and made mistakes. For example, ID 73 sent the
same email three times, ID 69 and 75 introduced herself with one name, and sub-
sequently signed the email with another name, ID 22 mentioned conflicting infor-
mation about the size of the rent, ID 111 addressed his second email to the wrong
person, and another scammer sent the exact same email twice in a row, but once
addressed to the wrong person.
• Scammers repeatedly used bogus arguments. For example, ID 24 claimed that a
bank statement or employment contract was not an ‘acceptable’ proof of payment
ability in Westminster. Instead, the victim was asked to transfer money via West-
ern Union. Similarly, ID 76 preferred Western Union transfers over regular bank
transfers due to the “high fraud occurrence in regular banks”.
• Although scammers used a wide variety of social persuasion techniques some were
inappropriate for a British context. For example, scammers often appeal to au-
thority by mentioning their lawyer or solicitor, and although this is a legitimate
appeal to authority, it is not that relevant in the context of renting an apartment
in the UK. Scammers also describe themselves as “God fearing” which may have
been persuasive in Britain two generations ago but is not any more. In fact the
word ‘God’ has been identified as an effective filter-word against targeted scams on
Craigslist [22].
• Although scammers asked for information in most of their emails, this was not the
type of information genuine landlords request. For example, the scammers regularly
wanted a proof of payment ability (42%) at an early stage – whereas this would
normally occur much later in the process. Genuine house owners or letting agents
would be more keen to determine the preferred move-in date. This disparity is
of course understandable because the ‘proof of payment’ will, as explained above,
allow the scammer to walk away with the money as soon as possible.
• A scammer providing a reference might be seen a sign of scam expertise, as it can
help to establish credibility. However, when looking more closely at the execu-
tion, one can wonder how convincing such a reference is if the language use and
grammar/spelling mistakes are very similar to that of the scammer himself.
• Sometimes the scammers’ stories are not well thought out enough. For example,
ID 92 suggested using UPS as a third party to ensure a safe transfer of keys and
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deposit, but when asked where information about this UPS service could be found,
the scammer responded: “I don’t know where to find this service on their website
either and I don’t have a link to it”, reducing his credibility rather than enhancing
it. Similarly, ID 84 offered to fly to the UK to show the victim around the apartment
and sort out the contract. However, the flight the scammer said he booked did not
exist. When confronted with this, the scammer stopped responding.
• Last, but far from least, scammers did not always provide enough information to
make the money transfer. In a quarter of all conversations it remained unclear to
the very end how exactly payment was to be made or how much money would be
involved.
There is a striking parallel between the strengths and weaknesses of the scammers’
persuasion techniques and those of legitimate businesses that rely on large numbers of
sales staff to push their products. The authors have personal experience of industrial
fundraising, and experience from student days of selling home improvements, insurance
and advertising; we also have experience of listening to sales pitches from car dealers
and others. The common pattern is that a sales organisation recruits staff who appear
resourceful, personable and extravert; equips them with a sales script; trains them on
objection handling; provides a number of techniques to close the sale; and incentivises
particular business models. For example, when buying a car recently, one of us was
struck not only by the similarity in sales pitches from staff at the dealers of different
brands of car in different towns, but also that they all pushed hard to sell car finance
and extended warranties, starting with the line that “We are authorised by the Financial
Conduct Authority, so we are required to ask you a few questions”. This behaviour is
perfectly understandable as the commission from finance sales can exceed the margin on
the vehicle itself. Similarly, the rental scammers’ persistent attempts to get their deposit
via Western Union rather than bank transfer is perfectly understandable in terms of the
cost and inconvenience of replacing bank accounts that are closed following complaints
of fraud.
Despite having multiple offenders targeting multiple victims in a systematic manner
with a lot of common techniques the police appear to be dealing with this crime solely
in a reactive mode on a case by case basis, as we will now discuss.
3.5 Rental scam victims
With the assistance of the University of Cambridge’s Graduate Union (to which all grad-
uate students belong), we invited victims of rental scams to fill out a questionnaire about
their scam experience. We received four complete responses which help us understand
the point of view of real victims and what happens when money is actually transferred.
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All four victims are students at the University of Cambridge, between 18 and 25
years old. Two are male and two female. None of the victims was scammed more
than once, and on average they lost £602.50. All four said they found out about the
accommodation online, but were not referred to an additional payment website. Three
out of four were scammed when distance-renting accommodation, and three out of four
rented accommodation from someone who pretended to be the landlord.
The scammers had asked for the victims’ name (100%), their email address (100%),
mobile phone number (100%), date of birth (25%), current address (50%), a scan of their
passport (75%) and their bank account details (50%). All requested information was
provided.
We were also interested to learn about the victims’ decision process, and asked them
about any suspicions they may have had. Two victims indicated that they had not been
suspicious at all, one victim only got suspicious after transferring the money and one
victim got suspicious near the end of the scam.
We also asked about the financial and emotional impact of being scammed. On average
they rated the financial impact as a 6.5 on a 10-point scale, but the emotional impact an
8.5. Rental scams can have serious negative impact on the victim’s life, especially if the
scam is only discovered when the new student is left standing in front of a closed door
with all their belongings. This supports Button et al., who propose we should also take
into account the emotional impact of scams [3].
After being scammed, all four victims contacted the scammer, the police and their
bank. Half of the victims additionally contacted the website that hosted the advertise-
ment, and a consumer protection agency. In three out of four cases, the police took a
statement and the victims were told they would receive updates on progress. None of the
victims received any updates – but one eventually called the police back and was told
some progress in solving the crime was being made. This dataset is too small to draw any
general conclusions from but is in line with concerns about how effectively the British
police tackle cybercrime, as identified by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in
the Strategic Policing Requirement [15]. The point is that individual frauds in the high
hundreds to low thousands will generally be ignored, especially if there is an online or
overseas element, as the police assume that investigation will be hard. However once
these are seen as a pattern of organised crime, costing victims millions of pounds a year,
the analysis and response may well be different.
4 Discussion
We have sought to provide an insight into the nature and prevalence of rental scams,
and into the social persuasion techniques used during the scam process. At the start of
this research, we were interested in whether rental scammers just follow a pre-determined
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script, or if they are skilled at the art of persuasion.
We scraped letting advertisements from Craigslist during a three-week period in early
2014, categorized each advertisement as ‘genuine’, ‘fake’ or ‘unsure’, and followed up on
the ‘fake’ and ‘unsure’ cases. We responded to scammers and pretended to be a potential
victim. We gave the scammer three emails to convince us to transfer money to him.
We analysed 44 email interactions for scam characteristics and social persuasion tech-
niques. We also asked four real-world rental scam victims about their experiences.
We found that scammers targeting the UK predominantly posted fraudulent adverts
for property in London, and to a lesser extent in university cities such as Cambridge,
Oxford, Liverpool, Manchester and Aberdeen. Victims are asked to pay a deposit or to
transfer money to a friend by Western Union to prove they have the money – which is
then stolen using the information on the receipt.
The sums involved ranged from £100 to £2 560. Some scammers also directed pay-
ments to be made to third parties or to websites that they presumably controlled.
We identified ten social persuasion techniques in the literature and determined their
prevalence at an email, conversation and scammer level. Scammers regularly imple-
mented a wide variety of persuasion techniques, predominantly Cialdini’s commitment
and consistency, liking, authority and scarcity [6]. An appeal to sympathy, established
by Stajano and Wilson was also frequently used to convince potential victims to transfer
money [26].
Although Lea et al.’s appeal to need and greed was seldom explicitly present in the
emails, it is the underlying assumption of most of the original fraudulent advertisements
because the scammers are offering wonderful apartments at prices that are below the
market rate [18].
We also found that some of the scammers’ persuasion techniques fell outside of the
categories we found in the deception literature. We therefore added two techniques:
‘establish credibility’ and ‘remove objections’, both of which appear in the sales and
marketing literature. The first of these relates to how scammers try to appear credible
by providing explanations and references, referring to authority figures, and mimicking
the actions of genuine landlords. The second describes the way scammers are far more
flexible and accommodating at dealing with objections than any genuine landlord would
be. Apartments turned out to be available on any date of our choosing, rental periods
were entirely flexible and the space could be either ‘furnished or unfurnished’.
Establishing credibility as a persuasion technique has also been identified in postal
scams and both how to appear credible and how to respond to a potential buyer’s objec-
tions are key parts of training for legitimate sales and marketing activities [4]. Hence we
believe that these two new categories are not specific to rental scams but will be found
to be important types of persuasion in many other situations as well.
We assessed whether scammers are skilled at their job, or if they merely copy-pasted
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text that had worked in the past. Our repeated email interactions with rental scammers
is, we believe, the first time that this has been studied.
Our results indicate that scammers operate very much like the sales staff at a legal
business oriented towards interpersonal sales, such as car dealerships, insurance brokers
and home improvements. Scammers start off their pitches using scripts that appeared to
be widely shared among the cases we studied. They implement a wide variety of social
persuasion techniques that have clear analogues in legitimate sales and marketing. They
successfully impersonate genuine landlords by asking for rental-specific information, by
answering the majority of the victim’s questions, by offering the option of a viewing,
and by providing a method of contact. They also use a clever way of getting hold of
the victims’ money, abusing a feature of money transfer systems that many potential
victims fail to understand. The purpose of using this trick for obtaining the money is
to minimise the cost to the scammers of replacing bank accounts that are blocked after
victims’ complaints. However, scammers could also be flexible. For example when we
showed hesitation about a Western Union payment, the scammer provided general bank
details for a regular transfer.
However, when examining scammer behaviour in detail, it turns out their skills might
be described as routine, and also limited by a lack of contextual and cultural knowledge
(as might be expected if most of the scammers are operating from overseas, and merely
have an agent in the UK to pick up the proceeds).
Even though they answered at least one question in the majority of emails, they
failed to answer all questions in two-thirds. Even when the scammer sent a pre-scripted
response, he often managed to ‘accidentally’ answer a question. In some cases, even
well into the email conversation, pre-scripted emails were still being sent. Although the
scammer tried to mimic a genuine landlord, he did not always carry it out properly. For
example, the scammer provided the exact address in only 18% of all conversations, and
still wanted advance payment before viewing. And although scammers did use a wide
variety of social persuasion strategies, they failed to fit in with British culture. Their
appeals to authority predominantly involved lawyers, solicitors and God in ways that
were irrelevant to the way in which rentals usually proceed in the UK. Overall we found
that though there was evidence of some skill, the scammers we interacted with provided
enough warning signals to tip off a potential victim.
Herley argued that online crime falls into two categories – targeted attackers and
scale attackers [14]. A typical targeted attacker is a highly skilled fraudster who sends
phishing emails to a high-value target, such as the CFO of a company, with a view to
taking over their computer and commanding unauthorised payments; such a fraudster
may invest thousands of dollars’ worth of time and effort, and if successful may manage
to steal several hundred thousand dollars using wire transfers. A typical scale attacker
is someone who infects large numbers of PCs using drive-by downloads and sells them
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to botnet herders; as the market price for compromised PCs is perhaps $10 per 1000,
the scale attacker cannot spend more than a nickel on each successful attack if he is to
make money. Researchers had previously remarked on the apparent absence of attackers
between these “first class” and “economy class” models of cybercrime.
Rental scams give an example of the missing middle. The skill levels required to
conduct such scams are not zero, but neither are they astronomically high. Someone
with experience as a street hustler or market-stall operator probably has the basics; add
a working knowledge of written English and knowledge of crime scripts that have worked
in the past, plus someone on the ground in the target country to collect the proceeds
from a Western Union office, and a scam gang is in business. In short, setting up a 419
gang to do rental scams is not much different from setting up any other small selling
business. This now appears to be an established modus operandi, and as noted the crime
proceeds appear to be well into seven figures. Rather than considering it to be petty
crime that is not worth more than a routine bookkeeping response, police forces should
take it seriously and look for the bottlenecks where law enforcement pressure can be
brought to bear – whether on the organisers, the cash out operatives in target countries,
or the money transfer firms themselves.
Payment service regulators in particular should consider imposing policy changes on
companies such as Western Union and MoneyGram to require proof of identity on col-
lection, which would increase the cost and risk to the scammer of operating in this way.
5 Conclusions
At the operational level, this paper has documented how advance fee frauds are no longer
implausible money-laundering schemes that only exceptionally gullible people would fall
for, but have many new guises including rental scams that net millions a year. Although
‘419 scams’, as they are also known, have been mostly targeted at the Western World,
there is increasing evidence of activity in Asia and the Caribbean [25, 29, 1]. This is
unsurprising because there are few barriers to targeting victims anywhere in the world
other than possibly language.
The scientific work reported in this paper analyses the persuasion techniques that
the scammers use. Previous work concentrated on the initial fraudulent communication
whereas we have gone further by going through the whole scam process and giving the
scammer three chances to ask for money before discontinuing the interaction. This has
shown us the techniques scammers use, and they turn out to be not hugely different
from people selling used cars, life insurance or home improvements. They have a mass
prospecting technique, namely ads for apartments at competitive rentals in cities with a
large transient population. They respond to inquiries from prospects using sales scripts,
which are similar across multiple operatives. They use the standard sales and marketing
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techniques documented by Cialdini and other students of marketing, with a few twists
that we describe. They have common techniques for dealing with objections. They have
common sales closing strategies and techniques. Just as car salesmen push customers
to buy on credit, so they can enjoy the finance sales commission as well as the margin
on the vehicle, so also the scammers push people to use Western Union or MoneyGram,
presumably to cut the costs of replacing blocked bank accounts. However they are flexible;
just as a car dealer will accept cash if they have to, so also a scammer will provide a
bank account to receive a deposit transfer if the mark stubbornly refuses to send money
by Western Union.
This is of independent interest to the cybercrime community as previously scammers
had been argued to be either highly-skilled targeted attackers who go for high-value
targets, or scale attackers who use fully automated techniques. The rental scammers
give us a good example of criminals operating in the middle, using moderate levels of
skill to defraud people of moderate amounts of money (high hundreds to low thousands)
but on an industrial scale. These criminals show all the signs of being organised, just as
legitimate businesses are.
This has specific implications for policy. First, the police should treat rental scam
complaints as evidence of a well-organised international crime, netting millions a year,
rather than isolated fraud losses. Second, bank regulators should crack down on Western
Union and other money transfer firms to insist upon total clarity about the risk of using
these services. Third, we should explore ways to warn potential victims. In particular,
universities should warn students about rental scams and inform them of accredited
accommodation agencies.
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